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How do recipients of foreign assistance regard what they receive? Although assistance provides presum-
ably life-saving or life-improving goods and services, it also entails unsavory dynamics that can frustrate the
relationship between donors and recipients. I theorize that contact with foreign-assistance workers — i.e.,
people who design or deliver foreign assistance — can improve the relationship between donor and client.
Buttressed by intergroup-contact and infrahumanization theories, I posit this improvement stems from a
humanizing effect. The contact transforms what was an abstract bureaucracy into a concrete, embodied,
personal experience. I examine the implications of this theory in the context of the World Bank, using
individual-level survey data from the organization’s 2012-2016 Country Opinion Survey (COS) Program and
from the 2002-2003 Afrobarometer series. I find a positive relationship between contact with and attitudes
toward the World Bank in the COS data and between membership in a community-development association
(to proxy for contact) and attitudes toward the World Bank in the Afrobarometer data. Broadly, this paper
is an exploration of the quotidian, routine operations and their effects on the legitimacy and impact of foreign
assistance.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Foreign assistance has been simultaneously celebrated for its efficacy, disregarded for its impotence, and vili-
fied for its hubris. These different, competing assessments share an interest in the effects of foreign assistance
and an appreciation of the processes that beget them. By “foreign assistance,” I mean intervention by foreign
parties intended to improve human existence abroad, however vaguely and broadly defined. This includes
peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations in post-conflict areas, development assistance that seeks to build
economic and institutional capacities, and humanitarian aid in response to acute crises. It encompasses
the work of national aid agencies, international organizations (IOs), and international nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs).
One way to understand the effects of foreign assistance and the processes that beget them appreciates
the voices and perspectives of the people intimately involved in the process: foreign-assistance workers and
recipients (e.g., Anderson, Brown, & Jean, 2012; Dijkzeul & Wakenge, 2010; Feldman, 2017). In identifying
foreign-assistance workers as entry points, researchers have explicitly recognized that these workers’ insights
and experiences can speak to the constraints, incentives, and motivations that shape their work. Similarly,
asking recipients about their perspectives on what they receive can add to our understanding in a number of
ways. If recipients’ lives are the ones for whom foreign assistance is supposed to improve, their assessments
can convey if it is working and why or why not. Asking recipients can also bypass the blinders that govern
how foreign-assistance workers assess their work and can unearth tensions that would otherwise go unnoticed
(World Bank Group, 2015). Official reports and assessments may neglect to disclose the unsavory but chronic
features of foreign assistance (Camfield, Duvendack, & Palmer-Jones, 2014; Carneiro & Garbero, 2018; Honig,
2018; Fast, 2014: 56), which means these reports often miss important components of the foreign-assistance
experience. Seeking information from the parties that participate in and make possible foreign assistance
can fill in the gaps of what is unintentionally overlooked or intentionally excluded.
In line with this approach, I assume that the attitudes and assessments of recipients capture something
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about foreign assistance. Theoretically, I argue that the everyday, on-the-ground interactions that recipients
have with foreign-assistance workers can shape how the former regard the intervention.1 Buttressed by work
on intergroup contact and infrahumanization, I posit that the contact between foreign-assistance workers
and recipients provides organic opportunities for groups to regard the other as equally human, equipped with
secondary emotions like remorse, regret, love, and hope, which are what people tend to view as distinctly
human (Leyens et al., 2000). Next, I argue that foreign-assistance workers, in representing the organizations
for which they work, render assistance a concrete, embodied, and personal experience for recipients through
contact with them. A positive, humanization-inducing contact can improve attitudes toward the IOs for
which the foreign-assistance worker works because the IOs are known through their workers.
To evaluate this theory, I use 2012-2016 data from the World Bank Country Opinion Survey (COS)
Program, which solicits opinions from the individuals who work, in different capacities and to varying
degrees, with the World Bank Group.2 Examples of this include positions in national or local governments,
bilateral or multilateral aid agencies, faith-based groups, the media, academia, among others. These data
have the potential to broaden our understanding of the donor-recipient relationship by tapping into the
opinions of individuals who work within client countries. Through their work, these individuals see and can
speak to the routine and seemingly unremarkable aspects of foreign assistance that do not appear in official
reports. Admittedly, the World Bank has been the subject of numerous examinations. These have explored
the policies it pushes (Craig & Porter, 2003; Goldman, 2005; Stein, 2008, 2011; Woods, 2006), organizational
culture (Weaver, 2008), institutional reform (Nielson & Tierney, 2003), and issues with accountability (Fox &
Brown, 1998; Kim, 2011), for examples. Yet the data from the COS Program examined here provide a view of
the World Bank from a population of people who, to varying degrees, have observed the organization’s work
and have engaged with its employees. I also examine data from the 2002-2003 Afrobarometer in light of my
theory. These individual-level data include residents of 15 countries in Africa. I utilize this survey’s inclusion
of a question of membership in community-development associations (CDAs). Leveraging the observation
that contact with the World Bank varies by CDA membership, I examine an implication of my theory:
Ratings of the World Bank should vary according to CDA membership (official leader, active member, and
inactive or nonmembers) because contact with the IO varies by membership status.
The paper proceeds as follows. I first review existing work on attitudes toward foreign assistance, par-
1This is not to be confused with what has been called the “everyday turn” of peacebuilding scholarship, which relies on
“emancipatory” approaches and privileges the “local” in an attempt to challenge the liberal-peace paradigm that underpins
peacebuilding efforts (see Randazzo, 2016). I am not referring to this scholarly interest in the local, emancipatory approach
— curiously described as “everyday” — when I use that word to describe an interaction. The everyday is experienced by all
parties; it is not exclusive to the marginalized.
2Technically, the World Bank Group comprises five organizations; two of these work in development for the world’s poorest:
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA).
These two constituent parts make up what is colloquially known as the World Bank.
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titioning the literature into two ways of thinking about how aid is received: that assistance is largely liked,
and that assistance is largely disliked. I then detail my theory, focusing on intergroup contact, the power
of the everyday interactions for shaping people’s attitudes, and the link between IOs and the people who
work in them. Next, I present the data and research methodology, evaluate the findings, and conclude by
reflecting on what this means for foreign assistance, international legitimacy, and ways of engaging.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Two competing ideas provide explanations for how residents in countries receiving assistance perceive what
they get. The first suggests that it is largely welcomed, accompanied by a seemingly straightforward notion:
Foreign assistance supplies people in precarious circumstances with much-needed materials and support.
The second idea recognizes that a power dynamic exists between foreign-assistance workers and recipients.
It acknowledges the possibility that recipients feel annoyed, aggrieved, or neglected by particular features of
this power dynamic, and it considers that recipient assessments weigh more than just material benefits. I
explore each in turn.
2.1 Why Assistance is Liked
There are reasons why recipients of assistance like what they receive. At its core, foreign assistance brings
funds, person-power, and support to places struggling with underdevelopment and conflict; plainly put,
assistance infuses resources into precarious spaces. This aid-as-resource-infusion highlights the fact that aid
brings development deliverables to recipients.1 These development deliverables include roads, schools, and
sanitation services among many others, as well as the capacity-building tools to sustain them. In post-conflict
peacebuilding, people want to transform a tenuous peace into a sustainable one, and they want to harness
the relatively abundant resources of the international community to do so. Girod (2012) proposes a theory
about why post-conflict reconstruction fails or succeeds; in naming her theory the nonstrategic-desperation
hypothesis, she plainly puts just why foreign assistance may be liked: There is a need, a desperation, for
what foreign assistance can offer.
This idea that communities hold assistance in high regards, on average, because it supplies deeply needed
things appears in some works on foreign assistance. In writing on credit claiming among elites in recipient
1However, note that unfinished projects frequent the international-development landscape (Williams, 2017).
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countries, Cruz and Schneider (2017) comment, “That people in communities which obtain foreign aid
projects tend to be favorably disposed to them is straight-forward and uncontroversial” (Cruz & Schneider,
2017: 398). Dietrich, Mahmud, and Winters (2018) ran an experiment in Bangladesh, hypothesizing that
recipients will hold more favorable views of the benefactor if they can recognize the source of their aid. In
their own words, “The perception that the donor cares about the aid-receiving country and its people should
generate diffuse positive affect toward the donor” (Dietrich, Mahmud, & Winters, 2018: 135-136; see also
Goldsmith, Horiuchi, & Wood, 2014). While they hypothesize rather than assume a positive relationship
between aid visibility and recipient attitudes, Dietrich, Mahmud, and Winters do not articulate why a
negative relationship could obtain. A related sentiment — that donors want recipients to “know whom to
thank” (Hattori, 2001: 647) — is evinced in the widespread use of branding by aid organizations on the
projects they fund.2 Why would these organizations make it a policy to put their name on the projects if
they think recipient communities dislike the intervention?
Findley et al. (2017) offer theoretical insight and empirical evidence as to why recipients may harbor
positive feelings toward foreign assistance. They propose that citizens will prefer external aid (e.g., from
the U.S., China, World Bank, African Development Bank) because this type is thought to be inaccessible to
domestic elites who, if it were accessible, would capture and funnel it for their own purposes. This suggests
that, even if the aid signifies an imposing, paternalistic, or visibly unequal exchange (three possibilities I
explore next), citizens prefer it over projects from their own governments. In other words, foreign assistance
may be liked because it offers an alternative to government-sponsored projects when the government has
given its citizens reasons to distrust it.
Scholars, in arguing ways that recipients come to dislike assistance, demonstrate ways that recipients may
like and want assistance. Consider that projects introduce resources that generate tension (Barron, Diprose,
& Woolcock, 2011, chapter 4). Implicit in this is that recipients desire to secure the resources that devel-
opment workers introduce; fights occur among potential recipients because one party covets another party’s
funding receipt. Thus, the assistance is desired; the limited amount of it is what recipients dislike. Above
all, recipient communities often contain a multitude of actors. Different actors have different preferences;
assistance, depending on its fungibility, can aid them in realizing these preferences.
2For example, the aid agency of the United States (USAID) is staffed with “branding champions,” has specific and detailed
instructions for how and where the USAID logo can be applied, and explicitly does this to make beneficiaries aware of the source
(see https://www.usaid.gov/branding). Dietrich, Mahmud, and Winters (2018) demonstrate, however, that donor visibility
and the effectiveness of development branding are limited. Similarly, Dunn (2017) calls into the question the extent to which
recipients can differentiate government-provided aid from foreign-provided aid, let alone differentiate what each foreign agency
and organization provided (Dunn, 2017: 78, 99-100; see also Autesserre, 2014: 177).
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2.2 Why Assistance is Disliked
Here, I explore the possibility that foreign assistance is disliked, focusing on three features of the donor-
recipient dynamic: imposition, paternalism, and visible inequality. The following review, though detailed,
excludes other reasons: For instance, a common assessment among recipients is that the assistance they
receive has not done enough to change their living conditions (e.g., Donini, 2007; Fishstein & Wilder, 2012)
or that it fuels corruption through subcontracting and procurement (e.g., Fishstein & Wilder, 2012). Also,
foreign assistance often gives the impression of descending then departing capriciously (Anderson, Brown,
& Jean, 2012: 26; Fishstein & Wilder, 2012: 51; McMahon, 2017).
2.2.1 Imposition
First, foreign assistance generally necessitates some form of imposition. This imposition can manifest in
formal conditions that donors attach to their assistance. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank, for example, require struggling countries to commit to macroeconomic and institutional reforms
in order to receive assistance (see Bogetic´ & Smets, 2017; Hermes & Lensink, 2001; Woods, 2006: 70-72).
Imposition can also appear informally as templates (also called toolkits), or pre-fashioned modalities imported
from previous projects and disparate contexts. Foreign-assistance workers rely on templates because they
distill the complexity of the issue at hand into something legible and tractable for foreign-assistance workers
(cf. Duina, 2010). They provide order and flow for problem assessment, structuring and disciplining thought
to make sense of the circumstances and to plot a plan to change them. Templates also allow past practices
to inform current approaches so that foreign-assistance planners and implementers do not have to reinvent
strategies for every crisis. Yet templates do not often accord with the goals, realities, or possibilities on the
ground because they neglect, by design, specifics of a place and problem, “search[ing] for broad generalizable
standards at the slight of the particular” (Barnett, 2016: 142). They trade texture for tractability in order
to produce a workable course of action; this can also bring about inappropriate and ineffective outcomes.
Post-conflict humanitarian efforts in the Caucasus are a striking instance of this. Following the five-
day war of 2008 in South Ossetia between Georgia and Russia, international agencies devoted resources to
water and infant-feeding programs for internally displaced persons (IDPs) even though, as Dunn explains,
“[b]reastfeeding in Georgia was widely accepted, formula remained easily available throughout the crisis, and
there was high-quality water in all the places IDPs were placed” (Dunn, 2017: 82). Imported from previous
interventions in African countries without regard for the current context, these templates for action in post-
conflict zones had consequences: “[A] model based on a totally different context was applied to Georgia and
hundreds of thousands of dollars in aid money was devoted to a problem that never existed. Meanwhile
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there were other problems for which no rules of thumb had been developed, such as diabetes in early IDPs
living on high-glycemic-index bread, macaroni, and sugar delivered to them by the World Food Programme”
(Dunn, 2017: 82). Additionally, recipients of micro-finance projects in Afghanistan reported negative views
of them, “consistently criticizing them as un-Islamic because they collected excessive interest” (Fishstein,
2010: 39). The micro-finance approach, which has been pursued elsewhere (e.g., Robinson, 2001), may work
when applied to circumstances that call for it — i.e., when it is germane to the realities on the ground so that
recipients desire to implement it. Therefore, the Georgian and Afghan examples highlight how templates,
when applied devoid of context, can lead to poorly appropriated funds and recipient resistance.3
These conditions and templates hail from a particular system — the existing constellation of IOs and the
powerful countries that influence them — and inherit a particular past. The disdain people hold for powerful
states bleeds into their perception of the IOs in which these states yield power (Johnson, 2011), and much
of foreign assistance occurs through IOs. Thus, if recipients dislike powerful states because they impose and
interfere, they may view IOs (and the assistance they provide) as imposing and interfering. Alternatively
stated, there is an imposition implied by IOs: Institutions created and led by powerful states can dictate
what and how states provide for their citizens through foreign assistance. We also need to consider the
particular past of international intervention. Claims abound about the (neo)colonial or (neo)imperial feel
of today’s foreign assistance, identifying the parallels between imperial operations of the past and foreign
assistance of the present (Hewitt, 2009; Kothari, 2006). Razack (2004) links peacekeeping operations to a
“new civilizing mission” (Razack, 2004: 49), which comes from the same logic of colonialism: Foreigners can
descend on an area, “discipline” the inhabitants, and dictate the terms of this disciplining. Both development
and colonialism, this line of thought goes, are articulations of foreign power abroad, motivated by racial ideas
and intended to reconfigure spaces according to the designs of the foreigner.
Here, it is helpful to think of colonialism in terms of collective memory, which is a shared understanding
and (re)telling of past experiences, passed down through generations and existing explicitly or implicitly
in cultural references (See Olick & Robbins, 1998, for a review of collective memory). Olick and Robbins
cite personal communication with Barry Schwartz, who compellingly describes collective memory as “both a
mirror and a lamp — a model of and a model for society” (Schwartz, cited in Olick & Robbins, 1998: 124). In
postcolonial spaces, a collective memory of colonialism shapes individuals’ identities and orientations toward
others. Schwartz’s dual metaphor of the mirror and the lamp highlights that collective memory not only
3Examples of this abound. Organizing elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo demonstrates this tendency.
Although violence had yet to abate in eastern provinces of the country and the vast majority of rural residents were unaware
of the purpose of the elections, peacebuilding efforts focused on elections as the way to commence the new peace. Elections
were understood as the natural focus of the intervention because elections had been implemented in other precarious places and
election specialists were readily available to enter the country and implement them (Autesserre, 2010: 102-114, 239-243). See
Donais (2009) for more on imposition, local ownership, and peacebuilding. On the topic of institutional reform, Evans (2004)
discusses how blueprints can lead to poor fit, which he calls “institutional monocropping.”
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makes the past and self legible (a mirror); it also is how present experiences and practices are evaluated
(the lamp). So, one need not have endured a personal experience of colonization to feel sensitive about
colonialism, imperialism, and imposition. Living in a postcolonial space may spawn a wariness to foreign
assistance as a way to jealously guard sovereignty (Menon, 2016: 57). Alternatively put, the collective
memory of colonialism can render state sovereignty particularly salient.
Additionally, foreign assistance can be seen as a strategic geopolitical tool by recipients, reinforcing
existing suspicions or generating new ones (Bradbury & Kleinman, 2010). Instead of having the intended
effect of “winning hearts and minds,” foreign assistance can provoke the opposite attitude because recipients
can sense what they presume to be the donors’ true intentions (Bradbury & Kleinman, 2010: 52). It is
well documented that foreign assistance often comes for reasons other than recipient need.4 Recipients may
view the assistance as generosity masking the donors’ instrumental goals. According to recent work, today’s
instrumental goals include thwarting immigration from places experiencing political upheaval (Bermeo &
Leblang, 2015). Bermeo (2017) argues that foreign-aid allocation in the post-2001 world is best understood
as “targeted, self-interested development” (Bermeo, 2017: 735-736). Foreign assistance tries to improve
the circumstances besetting recipients, which transcend boundaries and promise spillover effects, so that
donors do not have to address the repercussions. They care about development to the extent that the
transboundary issues (e.g., terrorism, climate change) will affect donors. Thus, recipients may conclude that
what they receive is not primarily intended for their benefit; it has less to do with them than it does with
the people providing it. In other words, foreign assistance may seem to be a strategic means to a selfish end,
not an honest end in and of itself.
Importantly, then, to understand attitudes toward assistance and the possibility that the assistance will
look like imposition, it must be situated in the particular systems and histories of the recipients and foreign-
assistance workers (Hattori, 2001; Razack, 2004). As Crewe and Harrison (1998) articulate, “A memory
of previous interventions, whether colonial or government- or donor-supported development projects, has a
profound influence on the way in which local people respond to the latest one” (135).
Yet Autesserre (2014) argues that it is not necessarily even the flavor of intervention that breeds disdain.
“[T]he very act of imposition,” before or beyond the ideological content of the intervention can be enough
to stir resentment or contestation (Autesserre, 2014: 53).5 In sum, the source of client-country disdain need
not hail from the character of the intervention but, instead, from the imposing nature of it. So, recipients
4On foreign aid, see Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Bermeo (2011), for examples. On humanitarian assistance, see Fink
and Redaelli (2011) and Francken, Minten, and Swinnen (2012). On motivations for sending peacekeepers, see Bellamy and
Williams (2013).
5This point is especially relevant to IOs such as the IMF and the World Bank, which, in recent years, have at least
proclaimed to been less wedded to neoliberal prescriptions, although some allege that reforms are only cosmetic and ceremonial
(e.g., Kentikelenis, Stubbs, & King, 2016).
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may dislike the notion and practice of foreign imposition to the extent that it conditions assistance in
oft-unchallenged but problematic ways, adopts previous practices and applies them without meaningfully
adapting them, or prescribes ways forward that neglect the realities of the past.
2.2.2 Paternalism
Another reason why citizens in recipient countries may dislike foreign aid pertains to paternalism, or “a
relationship that makes the subordinate’s development into a self-conscious project pursued by a directive
and supervisory authority” (Soss, Fording, & Schram, 2011: 24). It is “the mixture of emancipation and
domination that inhabit everyday practices of humanitarian governance” (Barnett, 2017: 5). Foreign assis-
tance occurs within, and contributes to, a network of hierarchical relationships (see Swaine, 2017: 198-199);
it is within this hierarchy that paternalism flourishes.
Paternalism is fed by the technical skills and expertise that underpins today’s foreign assistance. From
the crises of legitimacy in the 1990s arose the professionalization of foreign assistance in which standard
operating procedures, spheres of competence, and bureaucratization sought to improve both the practice
and reporting of foreign assistance (Barnett, 2016: 140-141). As a consequence, most foreign-assistance
organizations prize thematic knowledge over country-specific knowledge. As Autesserre convincingly argues,
“The idea of sending foreigners to a country they have never visited or studied so they can help people
they know nothing about makes sense only to individuals and institutions who place the highest value of
thematic competency and who deem local expertise unnecessary” (Autesserre, 2014: 72). Foreign-assistance
workers do not exhibit paternalism by simply valuing thematic competencies. Paternalism is shown when
they disregard the initiatives and intuitions of local actors, often conversing with recipient communities to
ask for pre-planned project buy-in (Feldman, 2017) or failing to consult with them at all (Swaine, 2017).
The allegation of paternalism does not necessarily deny foreign-assistance workers of honest intentions to
help; good intentions and paternalism are intimately linked. Paternalism is the product of a desire to help,
a judgment about the diminished capacity of who needs the help, and a belief in the superior capacity of
the helper (Autesserre, 2014: 100; Barnett, 2017: 21). Indeed, foreign assistance entails an obligation to
intervene and a sense of entitlement to do so (Heron, 2007); this obligation to intervene is born of good
intentions.
Baker (2015) illuminates the role of paternalism in shaping American support for foreign assistance. He
argues that white Americans exhibit a “paternalistic racism” whereby they attribute less agency to poor
black foreigners than they do to poor white foreigners. Specifically, white Americans were more supportive
of foreign aid when cued to consider foreign black recipients than they were when cued to consider foreign
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white ones, and this occurs because white Americans conceptually deprive foreign black recipients of agency.
The key insight from Baker is this perception of recipients’ agency. White Americans’ underestimation of
poor black foreigners’ agency suggests this: An assessment about the diminished agency of recipients inheres
in foreign-assistance workers’ decision to assist. This assessment presents an affront to recipients in that it
conceives of them as helpless and awaiting assistance (Baaz, 2005; Soss, Fording, & Schram, 2011). While
the outcome of this (giving) may be generous, the logic that motivates it (paternalism) may be insulting.
Paternalism manifests in foreign assistance across multiple issue areas.6 The anti-human-trafficking
movement, for instance, has exhibited paternalism by characterizing a variegated population of people —
some have been moved unwillingly and others that have moved voluntarily — as trafficked victims. This
characterization insists that people cannot consent to moving, even if they entered into the arrangement
knowingly and willingly. The movement circumscribes “consent” by defining it in narrow terms, thereby
liberally designating the status of trafficked victims (Merry & Ramachandran, 2017).
Portrayals of recipients make evident the paternalism of foreign assistance. The famine in Ethiopia of
1984-1985 was a watershed moment for development representation, forcing the humanitarian industry to
reflect and revise its problematic portrayals of human suffering (Baaz, 2005: 122-123; Lidchi, 1999; Wilson,
2012: 55-57). Still, the discourse of foreign assistance tends to construct recipients as “passive agents await-
ing the emancipatory intervention of development organizations” (Green, 2000: 68), and this construction
appears in the photographic depictions of foreign-assistance recipients. A common representation — a non-
descript child whose image is meant to depict the modal, quotidian suffering of her community — fails to
represent the full humanity of the depicted (Malkki, 2015). The child is featured not for who she is as a per-
son but what she represents: poor circumstances and impoverished communities. In other words, the child’s
image serves as a synecdoche for the entire “Third World,” reducing one’s humanity to her abject suffering,
a suffering that is awaiting first-world assistance. These images not only reflect the existing dynamics of
paternalism but also reproduce them (see Baaz, 2005: 121-123; Wilson, 2012: 55-67).
2.2.3 Visible Inequality
A third reason why recipients may dislike the assistance they receive stems from the material inequality that
exists between foreign-assistance workers and recipients. Foreign assistance necessarily involves a relationship
marked by material differences. The logic of assistance presupposes that some sort of need exists; otherwise,
either one or both parties would be hard-pressed to arrange the assistance absent the need for it.
Anderson (2009) presents evidence as to why this, alone, is not a compelling reason why recipients would
6Paternalism has been documented in assistance to Palestinian refugees (Feldman, 2017), in post-conflict peace efforts
(Autesserre, 2017), and in measures to combat sexual violence in Darfur (Swaine, 2017).
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resent the assistance they receive. In writing on the Listening Project, which asks recipients about their
perceptions of assistance, she explains, “[Recipients] understand and accept the impulse to help people in need
as a natural impulse. Perhaps because today’s aid recipients feel that, if they were in a position to help others
who suffered from a calamity, they would do so, they do not interpret the act of giving as an indication of
inequality” (Anderson, 2009: 99). Instead of something inherently incendiary about this material inequality,
it is about the visibility of this inequality — that is, how foreign-assistance workers operate in recipient
spaces — that engenders resentment. Many foreigners enjoy pleasant and more convenient accommodations
(Autesserre, 2014: 207; Heron, 2007: 75-79; Jennings & Bø˚as, 2015; Mosse, 2005: 26), maintain “enclavic”
and exclusively expatriate spaces (Duffield, 2010; Kohl, 2015; Kothari, 2006: 249; Smirl, 2015), and receive
salaries that wildly preponderate what local people earn (Baaz, 2005: 84; Crewe & Harrison, 1998: 82-84;
Fassin, 2012: 238-239; Fast, 2014: 144-145; McWha, 2011). They commonly navigate the physically taxing
terrain of the places they are stationed using vehicles, which they receive from work or purchase on their
own.7 Experiencing mobility with relative ease, foreign-assistance workers can move quickly and comfortably,
an option that is both evident and unavailable to most of the people they are sent to help.
Extending beyond how foreign-assistance workers traverse the places they are sent to serve, this mobility
privilege has a second component: the exit options afforded to them when precarious circumstances crescendo
to the point of imminent danger. In the latter case, foreign-assistance workers often have special evacuation
options than locals do not (Des Forges, 1999: 605-618; Fassin, 2012: 239-240; Fast, 2014: 195; Gru¨nfeld
& Huijboom, 2007: chapter 14; 108; Suhrke, 1998). For instance, during the Rwandan genocide, the UN
Department of Peacekeeping Operations told the UN force commander in no uncertain terms to remain
impartial and stay strictly within his mandate, yet he could use his discretion to ensure the evacuation of
foreign nationals (Barnett, 2002: 99-100). This instance of material inequality — an exit option in violent
circumstances — has life-and-death implications. For these privileged people, the rules of impartiality do not
apply, and yet we should least expect the field of foreign assistance to offer partial treatment. Humanitarian
efforts are predicated on the idea that all lives have equal value, but partial treatment in times of crisis
violates this; it ruptures, not fulfills, this equivalence of lives (Fassin, 2010). Foreign-assistance workers
are committed in theory to this ideal — this equivalence of lives — but, when it counts most, abandon
it by leaving the precarious place (Fassin, 2012: chapter 9). Abandoning the precarious place, despite the
reluctance or regret the departed may feel about it, exhibits an “ontological inequality” (Fassin, 2012: 226).
The point here is not to judge the cost-benefit analysis organizations conduct when deciding whether to keep
7Particularly striking in these contexts are sport-utility vehicles (SUVs) due to their occupation of space and their capacity
to consume gasoline. Foreign-assistance workers’ use of these imposing vehicles creates distance, both material (the barrier of
the vehicles and the speed of their movement) and symbolic (unequal access to comforts and security), between the assisting
and the assisted (Smirl, 2015: 101-106).
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or pull their workers or to propose that foreign-assistance workers stay when the circumstances compromise
their safety or efficacy. Instead, I want to identify this practice of partiality as a reason why people in
recipient communities may dislike or distrust foreign assistance.
Malkki (2015) explores the motivations that drive foreign-assistance workers to engage in the work they
do. She finds, “For them, there was a need to help [...] Taking that observation seriously meant revising
some basic assumptions about who “the needy” are in the humanitarian encounter” (Malkki, 2015: 3,
emphasis in original). This neediness can manifest in many forms. For some, the idea of the world outside,
the elsewhere, the “over there” enchants and entices many of them, and this, in part, is why they engage
in foreign assistance. Malkki also notes that the love and desire for travel propels many into this work.
Professional concerns compel some to engage. Equipped with the desire to increase their prestige and
credentials, many foreign-assistance workers exhibit, as Malkki describes, “a reluctant recognition that such
a track record [of rare and difficult circumstances] could be pleasing” (Malkki, 2015: 40). There is also
the element of self-escape; people can exit themselves by entering into a pursuit that is larger, global, and
significant. In short, foreign-assistance workers possess a need — to assist, to explore, to excel, to escape —
they cannot satiate without recipients’ state of need (see also de Jong, 2011; Heron, 2007; Rahnema, 1997);
the needs of the former to be “useful and generous, and as a link in a longer chain” of human efforts to help
(Malkki, 2015: 151) critically depend on the presence of the latter.
Material inequality is made visible when foreign-assistance workers act as tourists in the places they
are stationed. Examples of this include leisurely lounging on beaches (Autesserre, 2014: 204; Higate &
Henry, 2009: 106-109), sightseeing and shopping, and heavy drinking (Henry, 2015). To understand how
this could aggravate residents in places receiving foreign assistance, we need to situate it in the context of
global inequality and the particular circumstances of the place that merit assistance. The point on global
inequality matters when tourists hail from wealthy countries. In that case, tourism involves relatively rich
tourists entering into places, expecting accommodation and entertainment. These host places must absorb
the tourists, which encumbers the local environment by creating congestion or straining resources. The
expectation that the places will accommodate, entertain, and absorb can only be sustained by a sense of
entitlement on the part of the tourists, even if they intend no malice. Tourism often entails not just a flurry
of activity but an assumed sense of superiority from the tourists based on the appeal of the place. To tourists
from wealthy countries, the tourist spot is subordinate in terms of development but is superordinate in that
it entails a way of life that is more “essential” and “authentic” (Baaz, 2005: 54-56, 158-163), stripped of the
rationales and technologies that separate it from advanced places. The qualities that attract foreign assistance
to the place — its anachronisms — are simultaneously what render it appealing for tourism. Relegating
these places to pre-modern status degrades the logic that governs how and why these communities operate;
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treating these places as something before implies that they are beneath. This can be understood as seeking, to
borrow Turner and Ash’s (1975) term, “pleasure from the periphery,” through either the weather it affords or
the wanderlust it fulfills (Gray, 1970). Key here is that the value of these places comes from their peripheral
status, or their underdevelopment: The pleasure sought from the periphery derives from visitors’ attempt
to experience what they perceive as exotic or anachronistic (see also Mowforth and Munt, 1998). In short,
asymmetries of power inhere in tourism.
That this is occurring in places requiring foreign assistance compounds the offense. To residents, the
sight of foreigners “ ‘relaxing’ (and earning) in their country despite the need to tackle insecurity” (Higate
& Henry, 2009: 107) could suggest that the workers are approaching their time there as a holiday (even if
the workers do not regard their time there as such). In other words, conspicuous pleasure being enjoyed by
foreign-assistance workers in precarious spaces could be read as a disregard of the exigencies that brought
them there in the first place.
This display of entitlement and consumption that accompany tourist behavior — backdropped by global
inequality and local precariousness — may pique people who live there. This may hold even if the tourist
behavior opens news avenues for employment and generates new forms of economic activity. The surge
in economic activity from peacekeeping, for instance, often entrenches, rather than dislodges, the existing
social inequalities by benefiting capital-rich foreign developers (Edu-Afful & Aning, 2015), increasing sexual
transactions among the peacekeepers and the peacekept (Jennings, 2010), and pushing residents to the city
periphery because housing in central spaces becomes prohibitively expensive (Jennings, 2018). Thus, the
economic activity engendered by foreign assistance does not categorically or uniformly bring benefits. Put
differently, the economic activity generated by foreign assistance may offset the offense of tourist behavior
to the extant that it counteracts, rather than contributes to, the visible inequality that offends residents.
The friction arises, then, when the foreign-assistance workers — who are often handsomely compensated
— forget or fail to realize that their needs are being met but, still, assume a moral high ground. In doing this,
they often deny their local counterparts a metaphorical spot with them (Fassin, 2012: 238). As Autesserre
(2014) describes in the context of post-conflict zones,8
On the whole, interveners do not see their local employees or counterparts as making comparable
sacrifices or being similarly motivated by a desire to do good. In my fifteen years of interacting
with [interveners], I almost never heard expatriates refer to local employees in their organizations
as people who wanted to help their fellow citizens or their home countries. Instead, interven-
8Autesserre’s book relies on five kinds of data: field observations, participant observations, 295 formal interviews, hundreds
of documents (policy reports, agency memos, internal guidelines), and practitioners’ reports and academic writings. She spent
extensive time in the Democratic Republic of the Congo conducting the research and made trips to Burundi, Cyprus, Israel
and the Palestinian territories, South Sudan, and Timor-Leste.
13
ers regularly portrayed their local colleagues as individuals whose motivations were primarily
financial or professional. For local people in most conflict zones, intervening agencies provide
the highest paid jobs, whereas the state usually cannot pay its employees much (if anything at
all), and few individuals are able to make a decent salary in the private sector. This creates an
observational equivalence problem: It is impossible for foreign peacebuilders to know whether
local employees are working for international agencies for the sake of the cause or for the sake
of the salary (and status) — or simply because it was the only job they could find. However,
instead of recognizing this ambivalence, the dominant narrative reserves the moral high ground
for expatriates and denies local staff members a claim to altruism. (Autesserre, 2014: 197)
Likewise, Baaz (2005) illuminates the hypocrisy when foreign-assistance workers want to curtail daily al-
lowances for the local counterparts: “The argument the development workers sometimes put forward to the
partners, that ‘we do not get allowances’, is not without irony, given the total cost of an operation [devoted
to sustaining development workers]” (Baaz, 2005: 134, emphasis in original). Indeed, employment in foreign
assistance is a job, one that often requires sacrifice of comfort, family, and safety, but it also comes with
perks (e.g., status and travel) and is a choice (Heron, 2007: 45-52). To suggest otherwise likely gives the
impression that foreign-assistance workers do this work for self-congratulatory or disingenuous ends.
To improve this, Autesserre recommends that foreign-assistance workers “acknowledge the benefits that
they receive from their work, such as financial compensation, travel opportunities, rewarding relationships,
and career bonuses” (Autesserre, 2014: 268; see also de Jong, 2011). That recommendations about handling
this visible inequality exist (see also Anderson & Olson, 2003: 28; Higate & Henry, 2009: 108) suggests that
this visible material inequality provokes tensions. Baaz (2005) explores how foreign-assistance workers feel
about this inequality, and she reveals that they hold complicated feelings about it, “a constant vacillation,
with solidarity and altruism simultaneously disavowed and embraced” (Baaz, 2005: 90). By showing that
many foreign-assistance workers hold this complicated view of their role and motivation — altruism and self-
sacrifice, on the one hand, and guilt and isolation, on the other — we can see that this material inequality
produces qualms for the foreign-assistance workers. Also, the visible inequality between foreign-assistance
workers and recipients matters, in part, because it can lead to recipient resistance to assistance. Thinking
in broad terms, this material inequality — made obvious and palpable to recipients (Autesserre, 2014: 194-
214; Baaz, 2005: 3, 171; Higate & Henry, 2009: 82-83, 106-109; McMahon, 2017: 7-8) — is a reminder
of the contradictions, if not hypocrisies, of foreign assistance. In short, the material inequality they enjoy
is incompatible with the sanctimony some indulge, and this can strain the relationship between foreign-
assistance workers and recipients, which then can lead the latter to look unfavorably at assistance.
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Additionally, relative-deprivation theory offers insights about how the visible inequality that exists be-
tween foreign-assistance workers and recipients can generate negative attitudes. Relative-deprivation theory
assumes that “people’s reactions to objective circumstances depend on their subjective comparisons” (Walker
& Smith, 2002: 1). For feelings of deprivation to emerge, a person must make a comparison, construct a
cognitive appraisal of disadvantaged status, and experience a consequential sense of unfairness (Smith et
al., 2012). The theory predicts that, even if someone lives in impoverished circumstances, feelings of depri-
vation will only arise once this person sees that others enjoy advantages — material or ideational — that
are unavailable to her. We can apply this to foreign assistance. By observing the accommodations that
foreign-assistance workers enjoy, recipients may realize the relative deprivation they experience, and this can
breed resentment toward the entire assistance enterprise.
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Chapter 3
Theory
I propose a theory of humanization that can occur when foreign-assistance recipients and employees inter-
act. To summarize what follows, I consider how contact with foreign-assistance workers, who constitute
an “outgroup,” can improve recipients’ attitudes toward them. Through the everyday (often seemingly
unremarkable) encounters that constitute foreign-assistance work, recipients can see that foreign-assistance
workers are as equally human as they, themselves, are — despite the potentially imposing, paternal, and
visibly unequal arrangement — due to a subconscious process of humanization. Then, by considering the
link between IOs and the individuals who work in them, I argue that these foreign-assistance workers come
to represent the foreign-assistance organization from which they hail. This, in turn, can shape the way
recipients perceive what they receive. As I discuss below, individuals embody their employers; they make
concrete what was once abstract through their encounters with recipients. To buttress my argument, I rely
on three lines of research: intergroup contact, infrahumanization, and IOs.
3.1 Intergroup Contact
First, research on intergroup relations has shown that an individual’s attitudes toward outgroups — social-
identity groups to which an individual does not belong — can improve with contact (e.g., Al Ramiah et
al., 2014; Allport, 1954; Dasgupta & Rivera, 2008; Desforges et al., 1991; Pettigrew et al., 2011; Pettigrew
& Tropp, 2011). Generally, scholars attribute this attitude-improvement effect to two mechanisms: anxiety
reduction and empathy.
Regarding anxiety reduction, ingroup/outgroup dynamics are often characterized by a struggle for scarce
material and/or symbolic resources. There is a fear of domination, especially for relatively powerless groups,
and intergroup interactions can be fraught with fear of disapproval (Stephan & Stephan, 1985). Making
contact with an outgroup member, according to the anxiety-reduction mechanism, can mitigate this by
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updating beliefs and reducing stereotypes about outgroups and endowing people with skills to navigate
intergroup relations (Stephan, 2014: 249). Studies have given empirical credence to the anxiety-reducing
mechanism (e.g., Blascovich et al., 2001; Paolini et al., 2004; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011; Voci & Hewstone,
2003).
The second mechanism thought to drive the attitude-improvement effect is empathy, or the cognitive
and affective capacity to see one’s self in another person (Batson & Ahmad, 2009). Although humans
are capable of experiencing empathy, our “empathic capacity is constrained by social factors” (Inzlicht,
Gutsell, & Leagault, 2012: 361). Different activation patterns in the brain, when confronted with ingroup
or outgroup members, evidence that an “empathy gap” exists (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2012). People can engage
their empathic capacity to varying degrees, depending on the person toward whom they are to feel empathy.
However, experimental evidence demonstrates that, when prompted to access their empathy, people report
higher attitudes toward an outgroup than do those who were not prompted to feel empathy (e.g., Batson et
al., 2002; Finlay & Stephan, 2000).
Empathy, when induced, can improve attitudes, but what induces it in intergroup contact? What about
the encounter taps into ingroup members’ empathy and improves attitudes toward the outgroup? It is
important to note that much of the research on intergroup contact has been studied in intergroup dialogues
and workshops that are designed to facilitate interaction and elicit perspective taking and storytelling (see
Batson & Ahmad, 2009, for a review). Participants are asked to call upon their empathic capacity and focus
on the superordinate goal of dialogue on difference. Additionally, individuals participate in these exchanges
because hostility exists between them through their occupation of a different social group. Foreign-assistance
recipients and workers, however, interact despite hostility that may exist between them. These two reasons
— the nature and purpose of the interactions — mean that the aforementioned theoretical work gets us only
part of the way.
How does this apply to the recipient/worker dynamic and the question of attitudes toward foreign assis-
tance? The key insights to glean from the intergroup-contact research are 1) that attitudes can be endoge-
nous to contact and 2) that sustained exposure to people who occupy a different group can facilitate positive
attitudes. In my conception, foreign-assistance workers constitute one group, and residents of assistance-
receiving countries make up the second group. I assume that enough visible difference exists between these
two groups that it creates a salient social division. Although well-meaning, decent people largely constitute
the foreign-assistance group and harbor the desire to enact positive change in the world (Anderson, 1998;
Autesserre, 2014: 4-5; Dunn, 2017: 21; Fast, 2014: 43; McMahon, 2017: 4, 12; de Jong, 2011; Malkki, 2015),
the structural realities that distinguish them from recipients are real, palpable, and divisive, as reviewed
before. My theory assumes that this is enough for us to conceptualize two groups divided by a socially
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salient cleavage.
3.2 Infrahumanization
I now detail how empathy — seeing another as equally human — can emerge when it is not explicitly
summoned by the setting. Social psychologists have studied infrahumanization, the subconscious process by
which ingroup members fail to attribute secondary emotions such as hope, love, remorse, and contempt to
outgroup members and, instead associate with them only primary emotions like rage, lust, fear, and surprise
(Leyens et al., 2000, 2001; Paladino et al., 2002).1 There is a “differential association of uniquely human
characteristics” (Paladino et al., 2002: 114) because, by linking secondary emotions solely to their own
members, ingroups deny outgroup members the things we regard as exclusively human. Primary emotions
correspond to the visceral and primal; these emotions exhibit “quick onset, brief duration, and unbidden
occurrence” (Leyens et al., 2000: 189). Secondary emotions, in contrast, exist exclusively in the human
realm; they are how we distinguish the human species from other animals.
Both high- and low-status group members attribute fewer secondary emotions to outgroups than they do
to ingroups (Leyens et al., 2001). High-status groups like foreign-assistance workers and low-status groups
like recipients, then, both engage in infrahumanization. But how does this dual infrahumanization link to
the emergence of empathy in settings that do not explicitly summon it? Its inverse, humanization, subcon-
sciously bestows secondary emotions to outgroups, and it offers the possibility that empathy can emerge from
quotidian interactions, not just concerted exchanges like intergroup dialogue. Seeing an outgroup member
exhibit kindness toward an ingroup member over an issue unrelated to the salient intergroup tension can
foster humanization (Gubler et al. 2015). Experimental research in psychology has shown that mimicking
the actions of an outgroup member reduces biases toward the outgroup (Inzlicht, Gutsell, & Legault, 2012).
This does not mean that intergroup contact or humanization erases identity categories. In fact, one model
of intergroup contact proposes that the maintenance, not the elimination, of identity categories is essential
because it allows for generalization beyond contact with a single outgroup member (Brown & Hewstone,
2005). Otherwise, the positive exchange would not facilitate favorable attitudes toward the outgroup because
the individual would not belong to the outgroup if she is regarded as an exceptional member of the outgroup.
1This is not dehumanization, which denies an outgroup of any humanness (Leyens et al., 2007). Differentiating between
dehumanization and infrahumanization accounts for the possibility that, relative to the former, “something of much lesser
magnitude could occur in everyday life” (Leyens et al., 2007: 143).
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3.3 International Organizations and the People Who Embody Them
Much of foreign assistance occurs through IOs such as the UN and the World Bank. In order for attitudes
toward foreign assistance to improve through the aforementioned humanization process, there must be a link
between the IOs through which foreign assistance occurs and the people who work in them. Scholars have
sought to ascertain what this link looks like in practice. Notably, Barnett and Finnemore (2004) argue that
IOs are not mere instruments of the states that found them but are, instead, frequent, active, and often
independent participants in international politics. This conceptualization of IOs pushes us to look beyond
state interests and investigate within the things these states create.
One way to investigate within the things these states create is to focus on the individuals who populate
IOs. The literature demonstrates ways how these individuals shape IO operations. For instance, Chwieroth
(2015) posits that the professional training — and the normative orientation underpinning it — of IMF staff
influences the organization’s approach to enforcing conditions. Similarly, many have documented how the
ways that foreign-assistance bureaucrats see the sources of recipient-country problems shape what kinds of
assistance they prescribe (e.g., Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; Crewe & Harrison, 1998), and scholars have long
been interested in the types of people recruited to work at IOs and the staffing processes behind them (see
Novosad & Werker, 2018 and Par´ızek, 2017 for recent inquiries). Implicit in these analyses is the idea that
the types of people who work for an IO influences how the IO operates.
I add to this by centering on not who they are in terms of nationality, educational background, or
normative approach to foreign assistance. Instead, I focus on how they come to embody the IOs for which
they work and how, in this embodied role, they (inter)act with recipients. Because IOs are often large,
multifaceted institutions with numerous actors and interests embedded within them (Tallberg et al., 2014),
it is not obvious just how recipients form impressions of them. It is possible that the impression one forms
about them comes from the media or politicians’ rhetoric, which is often negative (e.g., Fast, 2014: 133;
Fishstein & Wilder, 2012: 53). One’s impression of these IOs can also stem from encounters they have with
actual actors who work for them. In this, the employees are not only the arms of the IO (implementing its
work) but also its face, animating what had been an abstract, distant organization.
How is foreign assistance experienced and understood by recipients? Projects are an obvious way; after
all, they are the foreign assistance, the “primary unit of planning interventions and of helping people”
(Krause, 2014: 25), or at least they way foreign assistance reaches recipients. Often projects are permanently
incomplete (Williams, 2017); in the process of being created; or, once completed, unable to signal to recipients
the organization that produced them (Dietrich, Mahmud, & Winters, 2018). The process of project creation
— the unfolding of events as the project is organized and implemented on the ground — holds opportunity
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for recipients to experience and generate understandings of the foreign assistance. Scholars, in studying
the securitization of foreign-assistance spaces, have questioned its effects and illuminated ways that people
apprehend space (Duffield, 2010; Fast, 2014; Smirl, 2015). Specifically, the structures of foreign assistance
(compounds, enclavic spaces, conspicuously pleasant accommodation, SUVs) do more than just shelter and
transport foreign-assistance workers. Foreign assistance is practiced through these structures and, through
them, takes on a physical form related to, but separate from, material project outputs. Alternatively put,
they are part of, and partake in, the formation of impressions that recipients hold.
Foreign-assistance workers do this, too, creating the live form. Foreign assistance is a relational act,
comprising “social beings embedded in a complex web of relationships” (Fast, 2014: 145). By considering
the relational nature of foreign assistance, actors on the ground become central, as do the interactions they
experience with each other. Interaction can take on many forms in foreign assistance because the nature of
the work necessitates a great deal of movement, people-power, and planning, in addition to the quotidian
operational details that allow it to function. This quality of foreign assistance — its need for people-powered
maintenance — makes it replete with interaction: There are items delivered, buy-in secured, meetings orches-
trated, terms negotiated, programs managed, projects evaluated, feedback solicited, stakeholders consulted,
and needs assessed. People, both foreign-assistance workers and recipients, are present in these activities,
making possible the many actions and exchanges that constitute foreign assistance.
Some scholars have foregrounded interactions between recipients and foreign-assistance workers, exploring
economic exchanges and their constitutive effects (Jennings, 2015; Jennings & Bø˚as, 2015) or information-
sharing interactions and their causal effects (Gordon & Young, 2017). Both point to the possibility that
foreign-assistance workers are agents in shaping attitudes toward because, in the constellation of foreign
assistance with its projects and structures, the people enact and embody their employers. Foreign-assistance
workers are central parts of this constellation. Organizations stress in their codes of conduct that their
employees represent the organization for which they work at all times, not only during official hours of
operation (Fast, 2014: 146-148). The idea that employees embody the organization animates the expectation
that employees will behave in a way that befits the organization’s projected image.
3.4 Theory, in Summary
I conceptualize interactions in foreign assistance as occurring between two groups (foreign-assistance workers
and recipients). There is an empathic capacity possessed by these group members, which favors ingroup
members over outgroup ones but which can also subconsciously grow to regard outgroup members as equally
human through secondary-emotion attribution. Finally, there is the IO embodied by individual employees.
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Contact resulting from the routine and seemingly unremarkable aspects of foreign assistance provides the
opportunity for recipients to apprehend the humanity of foreign-assistance workers — despite the imposing,
paternal, and visibly unequal relationship existing between them. Finally, this extends to the IOs from which
the foreign-assistance workers hail because they serve as the face of the IO and embody it.
The aforementioned theory hypothesizes that those who have contact with foreign-assistance workers will
hold more favorable views of foreign assistance than will those who do not have contact. Specifically in the
context of this research project, those who indicate that they work with the World Bank are more likely to
rate the institution favorably.
In studying individual attitudes toward the IMF and World Bank, Breen and Gillanders (2015) include
membership in a community-development association (CDA) in their models to proxy for civil-society in-
volvement. They find a positive association between CDA membership and ratings of the World Bank. On
this finding, they speculate that members of organizations devoted to community development will exhibit
greater trust due to the relevance of the World Bank’s mission. Yet, the works reviewed before open the
possibility for the opposite to occur: Precisely because these people care about and are involved in develop-
ment will they distrust the World Bank. Since this variable is a control, not a key explanatory variable, their
paper does not intend to explain why the link between CDA membership and rating obtains. It requires
more systematic empirical investigation. I turn to this later.
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Chapter 4
Research Design
In this section, I describe the two analyses that constitute my research design. The first employees data
from the World Bank Country Opinion Survey (COS) Program, described below, and the second relies on
data from the Afrobarometer survey series.
4.1 World Bank’s Country Opinion Survey (COS) Program
4.1.1 Data
To evaluate my theory, I use five years of data from the World Bank’s COS Program (World Bank Group,
2012-2016). This solicits feedback from individuals working in some capacity within a client country —
national or local governments, bilateral or multilateral aid agencies, faith-based groups, the media, academia,
among others — through survey questions in order to gain insights into how the client-country recipients
regard the World Bank. Part of the Public Opinion Research Group of the World Bank, the COS Program
began in 2012 and staggers its client countries, surveying them every three years.
Each questionnaire must incorporate specific questions to be aggregated into the World Bank Group’s
annual Corporate Scorecard. The World Bank Group’s Corporate Scorecard, produced each year, documents
the organization’s performance, and the feedback solicited by the COS Program features in, but is not the
sole source of information for, the Corporate Scorecard. The World Bank revises the survey instrument
for relevance in each country (Felzer, 2012), and an external public-opinion group designs and reports
the surveys (World Bank Group, 2014). Making no contact with potential participants, the World Bank
hires an independent firm to invite them (purposively and non-randomly) and to collect the data. For
each respondent, survey administration occurred one of three ways: Respondents received and returned
the questionnaire either by 1) courier or 2) email, or 3) a field consultant conducted face-to-face survey
administration. Surveys are translated and back-translated to ensure accuracy. Tables 4 to 8 in the appendix
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list each country surveyed, the number of people invited to participate, the number of people who partook,
and the response rates for each year of the survey.
The sampling procedure that the World Bank uses to gather responses does not guarantee a representative
sample of the population of interest. Thus, my analysis suffers from nonresponse bias to the extent that
nonrespondents systematically differ from respondents. It is plausible that nonrespondents feel less strongly
about the World Bank than do respondents since the latter group agreed to participate in the COS survey.
In this conception, respondents have strength of feeling, representing the extremes of opinions (i.e., those
who highly favor the World Bank and those who strongly dislike it). For my purposes, we need that these
extremes are represented equally across those who have contact with the World Bank and those who have
not. Put differently, whatever the skew (a sample of supporters, a sample of opponents, or a sample that
contains both extremes), it must be equal across those who have and who have not had contact with the
World Bank in order to calm concerns about nonresponse.
My project hinges on the difference in attitudes between those who have had contact with the World Bank
and those who had not, so it matters if the internal dynamics within potential participants that lead them
to partake or not differ between these two groups. Under the null hypothesis, attitudes toward the World
Bank do not vary according to contact. I could be led to commit a type-I error (rejecting the null when the
null is true) if motivations for participation differ according to contact in a specific way: Among potential
participants who have had contact, only the ones who rate the World Bank favorably participate, while a
different pattern of participation arises from those who have not had contact. In this scenario, I would be
rejecting the null not because it is false (i.e., contact begets favorable assessments) but because I examined
only the responses of those who have had contact and assess the World Bank favorably. Theoretically, I have
no reason to believe that this scenario, which says that among those who have had contact, only those who
assess the World Bank favorably chose to participate. People tend to expend energy to report feedback from
a negative encounter but are less likely to provide feedback for a positive one. There is no clear intuition
about the motivations and dynamics of participation — specifically, how the decision to participate in the
survey differs between those who have had contact with the World Bank and those who had not.
4.1.2 Outcome Variable
To construct my outcome variable, I use responses to the question, “Overall, please rate your impression of
the World Bank Group’s effectiveness in [respondent’s country].” Responses range from 1 (not effective at
all) to 10 (extremely effective); alternatively, respondents could select “don’t know.” In 2013, there were 297
“don’t knows”; in 2014, 437; and in 2016, 265. For 2012 and 2015, the “don’t know” option appears in the
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questionnaire but does not emerge in the data, which suggests that the COS Program coded “don’t knows”
as missing before publishing the data. I treat the “don’t knows” that appear in the data (i.e., in 2013, 2014,
and 2016) as missing. There is no natural position in the measure for the “don’t knows” to occupy or no
appropriate value within the 1-to-10 measure that subsumes that particular response. Although middle-
number scores (e.g., 4, 5, 6) seem like possible candidates, this choice would conflate a non-assessment of
“don’t know” with an actual assessment that suggests “average” or “fair”. This would conceal the subtle but
important difference that can exist between answers of “don’t know” and a middle score; the former does
not commit to assessing, while the latter offers an assessment (that happens to be a non-extreme value).
My measure imperfectly captures the concept it seeks to contain; an assessment of the World Bank’s
effectiveness may contribute to, but does not fully encapsulate, an individual’s overall feelings toward the
World Bank. In adopting this question as my outcome variable, I assume that effectiveness ratings correlate
with overall attitudes toward the World Bank, enough for the former to proxy for the latter. A second
limitation of this measure is that it (most likely, unknowingly) denies respondents the option to express a
neutral or middle option. Spanning 1 through 10, the scale contains an even number of options, although
this is not obvious because people assume that the score of 5 indicates the middle (Fowler, 1995: 53-55).
This is not ideal in terms of questionnaire design, but it poses a problem for my analysis to the extent
that awareness of the lack varies according to my explanatory variable, contact with the World Bank. Specif-
ically, it is a problem if respondents with contact realized that the absence of a neutral option and adjusted
responses accordingly while the other group did not. In that case, respondents with contact may report rela-
tively higher assessments of the World Bank. My theory would attribute their responses, artificially inflated
due to poor survey design, to contact with the World Bank. Theoretically, I have no reason to think that
the intuition about 5 indicating neutrality differs according to contact status. Alternatively put, I assume
that awareness about the lack of a neutral option is not systematic but random, if respondents realize this
flaw in the question at all.
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FIGURE 1: Ratings of the World Bank’s Effectiveness among COS Program Respondents, 2012-2016
4.1.3 Explanatory and Control Variables
I operationalize my explanatory variable, contact with the World Bank, using the questions asked to re-
spondents about their collaboration. Table 1 takes inventory of relevant characteristics of the survey for
each year. In it, I list the exact wording of the collaboration question and the possible choices with which
participants could respond for each year.
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TABLE 1: Inventory of Relevant Characteristics in the COS Program, 2012-2016
Year Countries Collaborate Question Collaborate Responses Positions Gender
2012 29 Currently, do you profes-
sionally collaborate/work
with the World Bank in
your country?
1) yes, 2) no 21 no
2013 41 Currently, do you profes-
sionally collaborate/work
with the World Bank in
your country?
1) yes, 2) no 21 no
2014 35 Currently, do you profes-
sionally collaborate/work
with the World Bank
Group in your country?∗
1) yes, 2) no 21 no
2015 32 Which one of the following
best describes your level of
interaction with the World
Bank Group (arms active
in country) in your coun-
try? †
1) I currently collaborate with
the World Bank Group, 2)
I have previously collaborated
with the World Bank Group,
3) Both of the above (I cur-
rently collaborate and previ-
ously have collaborated with
the World Bank Group), 4) I
have never collaborated with
the World Bank Group
19 yes
2016 39 Currently, do you profes-
sionally collaborate/work
with the World Bank
Group (arms active in
country) in your country?
1) yes, 2) no 19 yes
∗ Nine of the 35 surveys in 2014 include parentheses with the arms of the IO active in the country after “World Bank Group.”
† Surveys for Mauritania and Sudan do not include the arms of the World Bank active in the country within parentheses.
As displayed in Table 1, all surveys except the 2015 one ask respondents about collaboration with the
World Bank in a dichotomous way. The 2015 survey, in contrast, affords respondents four possible choices,
not two. I address this discrepancy by treating those in the 2015 survey who indicated either current,
previous, or both current and previous collaboration as affirming collaboration (i.e., they receive the value of
one on the dichotomous collaboration variable). Not only does the number of responses for the collaboration
question vary in these surveys; the wording of the question and the description of the World Bank’s constitute
parts vary (if present at all). Specifically, in 2012 and 2013, the survey refers to the IO as the “World Bank”
and does not include names of specific arms in parentheses. The three proceeding surveys refer to the IO
as the “World Bank Group” and sometimes list constituent arms in parentheses (although the 2016 surveys
consistently provide this information in parentheses). What does this mean for my analysis?
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It is not clear what the “World Bank”/“World Bank Group” distinction represents, but a careful exami-
nation of the surveys’ attendant documents illuminates the possible thinking behind it. In the 2012 and 2013
questionnaires, the IO is always called the World Bank, never the World Bank Group; in the next three years,
the reverse is true. Never does the 2012 or 2013 survey ask respondents to assess the World Bank Group, and
never does the 2014, 2015, or 2016 survey ask respondents to assess the World Bank. This suggests that the
wording change from “World Bank” to “World Bank Group” signifies a shift only in language, not content.
The questionnaires still task respondents with evaluating the IO, whether it uses the term “World Bank”
or “World Bank Group.”1 Whatever the logic behind the wording shift, my theory makes no distinction
between arms of the World Bank. The work of each arm within the IO differs considerably from that of the
other arms, and the amount of contact made could differ across arms because of the nature of their work.
My theory, however, does not articulate why the work an arm does drives how its employees behave when
interaction occurs.
Before I introduce the control variables, I explore how one feature of the outcome variable — the afore-
mentioned “don’t know” response — relates to my explanatory variable of collaboration with the World
Bank. Figure 2 graphs the number of respondents that do or do not collaborate with the World Bank by
whether respondents gave a numerical value or selected “don’t know” in response to the question about
rating the World Bank’s effectiveness for 2013, 2014, and 2016. (Recall that, for 2012 and 2015, the COS
Program seems to have coded “don’t knows” as missing prior to publishing those data.) If interaction mat-
ters for forming assessments, we should expect that the proportion of respondents who have collaborated
with the World Bank among those who gave a numerical rating exceeds the proportion of respondents who
have collaborated with the World Bank among those who said “don’t know” on the assessment question. As
Figure 2 confirms, while collaborators form the minority in both those who provided a rating and those who
answered “don’t know,” the minority of the former (0.44) is twice the size of the minority of the latter (0.22).
1The former term can colloquially substitute for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and
the International Development Association (IDA), or it can encompass all five arms of the IO.
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FIGURE 2: Collaboration with the World Bank Varies by Numerical Responses Versus “Don’t Know” in
the 2013, 2014, and 2016 COS Program
I include an employment-position variable to account for the possibility that the nature of one’s work
affects both how exposed someone is to the World Bank and how she views it. Someone’s work may determine
how much contact she has with the World Bank and how well she views the World Bank; employment
position, then, may confound the relationship between contact and attitude. To capture this, I use responses
to the following question: “Which of the following best describes your current position?” The norm in the
2012, 2013, and 2014 survey was to include 21 categories. For 2015 and 2016, the norm was 19 categories.2
In order to avoid deluging my model with variables, I meaningfully combine these positions into nine groups:
• Government: Office of the President, Prime Minister; Office of Minister; Office of Parliamentarian;
Employee of a Ministry, Ministerial Department, or Implementation Agency; Local government office
or staff; Independent government institution; Judiciary branch,
• Watchdog: NGO/community-based organization, media (press, radio, TV, web, etc.),
• Faith, trade, and youth: trade union; faith-based group; youth group,
• PMUs: Project Management Unit (PMU) overseeing implementation of project/ consultant/ contractor
working on World Bank Group supported project/program,
• Research: Academia/research institute/think tank,
• Bi/multilateral: Bilateral/multilateral agency,
2Examples of deviation from this norm include the 16 roles listed in the 2015 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab
Emirates surveys and the 12 roles listed in the 2016 Turkmenistan survey.
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• Private: Private-sector organization; Private foundation; Financial sector/private bank,
• State-owned enterprise, 3
• Other.
Some of the survey’s positions cohere into intuitive categories of employment. Consider the first of the
nine categories listed (government), which involves individuals working in the offices of a prime minister,
president, parliamentarian, ministry, local government, or the judiciary. Although distinct in important
ways, these positions are employees of government officials or the government and, as such, may share similar
career trajectories, salary expectations, and interest in prestige or service. Yet three of the nine categories I
created — watchdogs; faith, trade, and youth; and private — require justification as to why I formed them
as substantively similar employment. First, two positions that respondents could select (NGO/community-
based organizations and the media) constitute the watchdog group because they may task themselves with
speaking truth to power and holding IOs to account; they may regard IOs with suspicion or caution and are
critical of what they produce. Next, I combine faith, trade, and youth groups into one category because each
tends to attract members voluntarily through a shared interest, preoccupation, or practice (as people of the
same faith, as people with a shared skill, or as people of the same generation). Third, the private category
hosts the positions of private-sector organizations, private foundations, and the financial sector/private bank;
common among these groups are the deep, private pockets and relative abundance of resources that make
possible their work.
Finally, I include a dichotomous measure of gender as a control for the years that the COS Program ask
respondents for their gender (2015 and 2016). I constructed this variable such that men receive the value of
zero and women the value of one. Gender may drive who gets to collaborate with the World Bank while also
affecting attitudes toward the international organization (Edwards, 2009); failure to include it may omit a
confounding variable. Figure 3 depicts that, while the number of men preponderates the number of women
in my sample, collaboration does not vary according to gender. The proportion of both men and women
that report collaboration is 0.50.
3Only the China 2015 survey had state-owned enterprises as an option.
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FIGURE 3: Collaboration with the World Bank Varies Does Not Vary by Gender in the 2015 and 2016
COS Program (the proportion of men, 0.50; of women, 0.50)
Next, as shown in Figure 4, collaboration is more common than not among three groups: government
workers (collaboration proportion = 0.54, n = 7,010), PMUs (collaboration proportion = 0.79, n = 2,021),
and bi-/multilateral work (collaboration proportion = 0.66, n = 1,212). Among watchdogs, the collaboration
proportion is 0.33 (n = 2,480). Among faith/trade/youth groups, the collaboration proportion is 0.28 (n =
254). Among researchers, the collaboration proportion is 0.32 (n = 975). Among the sampled in private
work, the collaboration proportion is 0.38 (n = 1,807). Among those in state-owned enterprises, the collab-
oration proportion is 0.45 (n = 83). Among those who indicated their position as other, the collaboration
proportion is 0.37 (n = 712).
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FIGURE 4: Collaboration with the World Bank Varies by Employment Position in the COS Program,
2012-2016
4.2 Afrobarometer
4.2.1 Data
The Afrobarometer survey series asks questions to residents of countries in Africa in order to gauge attitudes
toward economic, political, and social issues. The survey series began in 1999 and continues today but,
because the Afrobarometer included a question on the World Bank only in its second round, the data I
examine come from 2002 and 2003 and include 15 countries (Africa et al., 2002-2004).4 The Afrobarometer
generates samples so that every citizen of voting age in a given country has an equal chance of being selected
using clustered, stratified, multi-stage, area probability sampling (Afrobarometer, 2018). Table 9 in the
appendix lists each country surveyed, the number of people invited to participate, the number of people who
participated, and the response rates.
4The Afrobarometer Round II included 16 countries, but I excluded Zimbabwe from my sample because its participants were
not asked the questions used to construct my outcome and explanatory variables.
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4.2.2 Outcome Variable
To assess attitudes toward the World Bank, I use responses to the following question: “Giving marks out
of ten, where 0 is very badly and 10 is very well, how well do you think the following institutions do their
jobs? Or haven’t you heard enough about the institution to have an opinion? World Bank.” Unlike the COS
question used to construct the outcome variable for the first analysis, this Afrobarometer question has an
11-point response.
FIGURE 5: Ratings of the World Bank’s Effectiveness among Afrobarometer Participants, 2002-2003
4.2.3 Explanatory and Control Variables
Respondents were asked, “Could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an
inactive member, or not a member [of] a community development or self-help association?” To construct the
explanatory variable, I coded a three-level ordinal variable: those who indicated no membership or inactive
membership, those who selected active membership, and those who chose official leadership. I treat those
who chose “don’t know/haven’t heard enough” as missing.
If interaction matters for forming assessments, we should expect that the proportion of respondents
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with active CDA membership or official leadership among those who gave a numerical rating exceeds the
proportion of respondents with active CDA membership or official leadership among those who said “don’t
know” on the assessment question. As Figure 6 illustrates, non-members or inactive members formed the
vast majority of both groups: 0.77 of those who gave a numerical rating and 0.85 of those who did not know.
Alternatively put, almost one fourth of the respondents who gave a numerical rating of the World Bank
were active members or official leaders of CDAs (compared to the proportion of respondents that were active
members or official leaders among those who did not know how to assess the World Bank, which was 0.15).
FIGURE 6: CDA Membership Varies by Numerical Responses Versus “Don’t Know” in the Afrobarometer,
2002-2003
My choice to use involvement in CDAs and to categorize this involvement as a three-level ordinal variable
requires an explanation. In treating this variable as my explanatory variable, I assume that the World Bank
engages with CDAs and that contact varies according to CDA membership status; official leaders will have
the most contact with the World Bank, then will active members, followed by those who are not members
or are inactive members.
The World Bank’s outreach to and involvement of local organizations has increased, not just for project
implementation but also the planning that precedes it (O’Brien et al., 2000; chapter 2). Including these local
organizations leverages organic participation and bypasses the challenges of inducing participation (Mansuri
& Rao, 2013). The World Bank has applied a “community-driven development” approach to some of its
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projects, harnessing the existing infrastructure of groups present in countries (International Development
Association, 2016). In fact, the IO has a unit called the Community Driven Development Global Solutions
Group dedicated to this approach.
This is not to suggest that the access afforded to outside actors by IOs substantially shifts the power
dynamics or prevailing ways of thinking within these organizations. Critics have problematized these mea-
sures, rather than assumed their ability to engender change. While some posit that civil-society invitation
has the potential for meaningful inclusion (e.g., Scholte, 2002), others have alleged it to be cosmetic and
insubstantial (e.g., Kim, 2011). The prevailing ways of thinking and doing have calcified over decades within
IOs, making IOs nearly impenetrable to change (Weaver, 2008); many have voiced suspicion over how well
inviting external actors into the process can actually engender change. For the sake of my project, however,
the issues or agendas that concern these external actors need not actually penetrate World Bank thinking
or practice; it is that the World Bank has involved these local stakeholders in project processes, and this
involvement begets interaction. Tallberg et al. (2014) examine the evolution of IO opening to transnational
actors (TNAs). For each IO in their stratified random sample of IOs, the authors construct a measure of
access that TNAs enjoy according to the range, depth, permanence, and codification of access each of the
n bodies within the IO affords (Tallberg et al., 2014: 746).5 Using the Tallberg et al. measure, Figure
7 displays two features of World Bank access: 1) The IO has increased its access since 1981, and 2) this
increase in access exceeds the mean access afforded by other IOs.
As mentioned previously, Breen and Gillanders (2015) found a positive association between CDA mem-
bership and ratings of the World Bank in the Afrobarometer data. They created a dichotomous measure of
CDA membership, grouping together active members with official leaders and non-members with inactive
members. While their dichotomous measure of CDA membership suits their purpose of controlling for civil-
society participation, it is does not suit my analysis since contact with the World Bank varies within CDAs.
IOs, in seeking to open up to civil society, often look to CDAs as natural apertures. In this way, CDAs are
conduits for contact, but the leaders of these groups manage access to them because meeting with many
individuals overwhelms the realistic capacity of an IO to conduct civil-society outreach.6 Indeed, this feature
is one of the complaints lodged against the World Bank: that it only scratches the surface of civil-society
engagement (Mercer, 2003). Returning to my analysis, official leaders of CDAs differ from active members
in terms of contact with the World Bank, and my coding of the explanatory variable treats them as such.
5Specifically, the formula is 1
n
∑n
1
(range + depth) x permanence x codification.
6Barnett (2016) makes a similar point that post-crisis response teams cannot canvas a large number of a population affected
by a crisis due to resource constraints (Barnett, 2016: 141-142).
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FIGURE 7: Access to International Organizations for Transnational Actors Over Time According to
Tallberg et al. (2014) Data
Returning to the Afrobarometer data, Figure 8 sorts countries from the lowest proportion to the highest
proportion of non- or inactive members in the sample; on the left, 0.63 of the sampled Kenyans identified as
non- or inactive members, and on the right, 0.95 of the sampled Namibians did.
35
FIGURE 8: CDA Membership across 15 Countries of the Afrobarometer, 2002-2003
4.3 Analysis
First, for each year of the COS Program, I apply ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to see the association
between the dichotomous measure of collaboration and a respondent’s 10-point rating of the World Bank.
I include employment position, gender (in years it is available, or 2015 and 2016), and the country in
which one resides.7 In addition to year-specific models, I run one model on all data from 2012 to 2016,
including country-year dummy variables to account for unobserved idiosyncrasies of time and place. For
the Afrobarometer data, I run OLS, regressing a respondent’s 11-point rating of the World Bank on level of
CDA membership. I control for gender, place (urban or rural), and a resident’s country.
7I include country-dummy variables with the exception of four countries in 2015 (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and the United
Arab Emirates). The COS Program grouped them together as the Middle East, precluding disaggregation by country for these
four. Thus, in my models, Bahran, Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates do not have their own country-dummy
variables and, instead, share one as the Middle East.
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Chapter 5
Results
Table 2 documents the results from running the analyses on the World Bank COS data. Results from
each year-specific model appear in chronological order, followed by results from the 2012-2016 model. The
coefficient attached to the collaboration variable ranges from 0.61 (95% CI: 0.49, 0.74; p = 0.000) to 0.77
(95% CI: 0.66, 0.88; p = 0.000). The magnitude of the collaboration-variable coefficient exceeds that of
all other coefficients in the models. Recall that the outcome variable is the 10-point rating of the World
Bank’s effectiveness; we must interpret the coefficients, tabled on the next page, with this in mind. In words,
collaborating with the World Bank is associated with a higher assessment — over half to three-fourths of
a numerical rating — of World Bank effectiveness, holding fixed employment position (and gender in 2015
and 2016).
Next, Table 3 shows the results from the Afrobarometer analysis. Recall that I constructed my ex-
planatory variable for this analysis as a three-level ordinal measure from four possible responses. I grouped
together those who indicated no or inactive membership to form the reference group, and I left distinct those
who selected active membership and those who chose official-leader status. Accordingly, as non-members or
inactive members as the reference, active members of CDAs reported higher ratings of the World Bank, on
average (βˆ = 0.14; 95% CI: 0.02, 0.26; p = 0.02), as did official leaders (βˆ = 0.39; 95% CI: 0.15, 0.64; p
= 0.002). Again, we must keep in mind that the outcome variable here is the 11-point rating of the World
Bank’s effectiveness. These CDA-membership coefficients are small in magnitude; when viewed in addition
to the COS results, however, they lend support to my theory.
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TABLE 2: Attitudes toward the World Bank Vary by Collaboration, COS Program, 2012-2016
2012 2013 2014
Variable βˆ 95% CI p βˆ 95% CI p βˆ 95% CI p
collaborates 0.61*** 0.49, 0.74 0.000 0.70*** 0.61, 0.80 0.000 0.77*** 0.66, 0.88 0.000
position
government
NGO/media -0.20** -0.36, -0.04 0.01 -0.45*** -0.58, -0.33 0.000 -0.27*** -0.41, -0.13 0.000
faith/trade/youth orgs 0.17 -0.24, 0.58 0.42 0.37** -0.67, -0.08 0.01 -0.50** -0.87, -0.12 0.01
PMU 0.39*** 0.18, 0.61 0.000 -0.04 -0.23, 0.15 0.70 0.32** 0.12, 0.52 0.002
researchers -0.24* -0.45, -0.03 0.02 -0.43*** -0.61, -0.25 0.000 -0.53*** -0.71, -0.34 0.000
bi-/multi-laterals -0.17 -0.45, 0.11 0.23 -0.23* -0.44, -0.02 0.04 -0.20 -0.44, 0.03 0.09
private groups -0.24** -0.42, -0.05 0.01 -0.45*** -0.60, -0.31 0.000 -0.34*** -0.49, -0.19 0.000
state-owned enterprise - - - - - - -0.17 -0.54, 0.19 0.35
other -0.10 -0.31, 0.12 0.38 -0.19 -0.41, 0.04 0.10 -0.29* -0.53, -0.04 0.02
woman - - - - - - - - -
R2 0.1265 0.1264 0.1340
n 5,066 7,427 7,252
2015 2016 2012-2016
Variable βˆ 95% CI p βˆ 95% CI p βˆ 95% CI p
collaborates 0.67*** 0.54, 0.80 0.000 0.70*** 0.59, 0.80 0.000 0.70*** 0.65, 0.75 0.000
position
government
NGO/media -0.26** -0.42, -0.09 0.002 -0.42*** -0.56, -0.28 0.000 -0.33*** -0.40, -0.27 0.000
faith/trade/youth orgs -0.39* -0.70, -0.07 0.02 -0.57*** -0.89, 0.26 0.000 -0.36*** -0.51, -0.21 0.000
PMU 0.48*** 0.26, 0.70 0.000 0.28** 0.08, 0.48 0.01 0.27*** 0.18, 0.36 0.000
researchers -0.55*** -0.79, -0.31 0.000 -0.65*** -0.83, -0.46 0.000 -0.48*** -0.57, -0.40 0.000
bi-/multi-laterals -0.19 -0.47, 0.09 0.18 -0.32** -0.54, -0.11 0.003 -0.22*** -0.33, -0.11 0.000
private groups -0.28** -0.46, -0.09 0.003 -0.49*** -0.65, -0.34 0.000 -0.37*** -0.44, -0.30 0.000
state-owned enterprise -0.45 -1.91, 1.01 0.54 - - - -0.20 -0.54, 0.13 0.24
other -0.02 -0.30, 0.26 0.87 -0.25* -0.51, -0.001 0.05 -0.19*** -0.29, -0.08 0.001
woman 0.17** 0.03, 0.30 0.01 0.14** 0.03, 0.24 0.01 - - -
R2 0.1272 0.1108 0.1276
n 5,051 6,687 31,872
*p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01, ***p ≤ 0.001
For year-specific models, country dummy variables are included but not reported. For the 2012-2016 model, country-year dummy
variables are included but not reported.
TABLE 3: Attitudes toward the World Bank Vary by Level of Membership in CDAs, Afrobarometer,
2002-2003
Variable βˆ 95% CI p
CDA membership
not member or inactive member
active member 0.14* 0.02, 0.26 0.02
official leader 0.39** 0.15, 0.64 0.002
woman 0.05 -0.04, 0.14 0.32
rural 0.07 -0.02, 0.17 0.13
R2 0.0602
n 12,196
*p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01, ***p ≤ 0.001
Country dummy variables are included but not reported.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This paper explores the possibility that a process of humanization occurs when foreign-assistance workers
and recipients interact. This happens, according to my theory, because interaction serves as opportunity for
the foreign-assistance worker 1) to embody her employer and 2) to exhibit her humanity. Using 2012-2016
data from the World Bank Country Opinion Survey (COS) Program and the 2002-2003 Afrobarometer to
examine this, I find preliminary support. This support must be interpreted with an eye to this paper’s
limitations.
The instrument that the COS Program uses — a pre-determined, close-ended survey — precludes certain
answers from arising. In that it does not allow for open-ended responses, it does not encourage participants to
share what is most important to them (Anderson, Brown, & Jean, 2012: 10-11). Furthermore, by offering a
pre-defined list of options, the instrument implicitly signals what is considered a valid response and constrains
what the respondent reports (Cornwall & Fujita, 2012). While the pre-determined list of options establishes
consistency across surveys, this comes at a cost, and the “othering” of alternative views may forfeit organic
feedback. In other words, the options you give respondents shape the story you tell, and this matters for
how we understand the relationship between actors in foreign assistance.
Yet a strength of the COS Program data should be stressed. The population from which they sample —
people in recipient countries that work, to varying degrees and in different ways, with the World Bank or in
a related field — has important insights and experiences from which scholars of foreign assistance can learn.
These people exist in recipient societies and observe what foreign assistance looks like in practice. In that
the literature on attitudes toward IOs overwhelmingly uses data from the general publics across the world
(e.g., Breen & Gillanders, 2015; Edwards, 2009; Johnson, 2011), we may be only getting part of the story
about the work being done on the ground. Most likely, these sampled people are not involved in the actual
operations of the IOs, which means that their opinions may not reflect what these IOs are doing in practice
and, instead, reflect what the zeitgeist says about IOs. By asking people who work with the World Bank or
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in a related area, we avoid some of this concern.
This project does not mean to suggest that only the presence or absence of contact with foreign-assistance
workers drives recipients’ assessment of the assistance. Other factors — chiefly, the quality and quantity of
the assistance (e.g., Donini, 2007; Fishstein & Wilder, 2012) — shape assessments. Pleasant and humanizing
encounters that yield partial or counterproductive results may do little to increase recipients’ assessments.
This project does suggest, however, that foreign assistance is more than just the facts on the ground (e.g.,
the number of deliverables disbursed). Alternatively put, we should appreciate the possibility that recipients
will regard foreign assistance beyond the outputs; it is not only about what is being disbursed but what
happens while it is being disbursed.
I approach foreign-assistance actors as if they exist in a dichotomy. A central part of the theory is that
two groups exists, and these two groups are constituted by their role and status in foreign assistance. Crewe
and Harrison caution against clear distinctions between “donor” and “recipient” and the treatment of these
as if they were mutually exclusive categories (see also Malkki, 2015: 26). Some foreign-assistance workers
from organizations are recipients in that they receive funds from states and other organizations to conduct
their work (Girgis, 2007). Scholars have stressed the heterogeneity among foreign-assistance workers (e.g.,
da Costa & Karlsrud, 2012). For instance, differences exist between permanent workers, consultants, and
volunteers in terms of prestige and compensation (McWha, 2011). Still, the categories of foreign-assistance
worker and recipient are necessary if we want to both honor and interrogate the power relations and material
inequalities within foreign assistance (Crewe & Harrison, 1998: 179). To discard these categories in analyses
of foreign assistance “is to deny the concrete conditions under which [recipients] clearly are [recipients] and
have shared experiences of both material and symbolic subordination” (Crewe & Harrison, 1998: 189). To
think about interactions in foreign assistance without categories ignores the very real divide that exists
between those who design or deliver assistance and those who receive it.
This paper joins others who have seemingly adopted a people-centric approach — or, at least, honored
the possibility that people involved in foreign assistance contribute to its performance and effects. For
instance, World Bank and Asian Development Bank projects with manager turnover receive lower ratings
than do projects with consistent managers (Bulman, Kolkma, & Kraay, 2017). “While this finding is in
some ways an intuitive one — project managers matter — it is one that is often overlooked in discussions
of the importance of institutional rules and implementation agency quality” (Bulman, Kolkma, & Kraay,
2017: 361). Similarly, the presence of trust and communication among development-project partners has
been linked to better outcomes (Diallo & Thuillier, 2005; McWha, 2011; Pasteur & Scott-Villiers, 2006).
These studies evidence the need to consider who is working in foreign assistance and how they engage with
others in their role.
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If, as my theory asserts, intergroup contact improves attitudes toward foreign-assistance workers, this
means that interactions are sites where assessments of foreign assistance are made and that foreign-assistance
workers are potential agents in this assessment-making (Gordon & Young, 2017). The organizations that
employ and deploy foreign-assistance workers should prioritize formal initiatives and informal conversations
about what this means. They can push for reflective thinking among their employees — getting them to
think critically about what they are doing and how they are doing it (Rahnema, 1997; Fast, 2014: 241) —
in order for ordinary meetings in foreign assistance to possess quality, variety, and depth (Pasteur & Scott-
Villiers, 2006). This act of problematizing their own practice (Eyben, 2003: 2) would mean acknowledging
that these issues exist, exploring what they look like, and noting how they manifest (World Bank Group,
2015). To the extent that recipient attitudes are a priority, reflexivity should be condoned, if not celebrated,
even if this clashes with other organizational imperatives. Additionally, as recent work shows, organizations’
push for monitoring imposes a rigidity on foreign-assistance workers that curtails what they are able to
achieve, especially in complex environments; the push for measurements and monitoring may force workers
to sacrifice long-term quality for short-term quantification (Honig, 2018). Accordingly, organizations must
consider how the directives they order and the quantifiable measures they expect limit the discretion of their
workers.
Explosive encounters have gained scholarly and media attention (e.g., Egeland, Harmer, & Stoddard,
2011; Fast, 2010, 2014; Hoelscher, Miklian, & Nyg˚ard, 2017).1 These violent, and sometimes lethal, en-
counters serve as strategic tools for warring parties to alter the dynamics of a conflict by eliminating the
ideational or material resources that foreign-assistance workers can provide (Murdie & Stapley, 2014; Narang
& Stanton, 2017). These attacks have appreciable significance, both politically and practically. They in-
still fear into foreign-assistance workers and elicit calls for greater security protocols to ensure their safety
(Smirl, 2015). They can compel organizations to leave the spaces they were serving in order to prevent more
casualties (see Fassin, 2012: chapter 9; Fast, 2014). Some have interrupted these events as a shift in norms,
signaling that sometimes combatants reject what had been previously respected — that assistance workers
are non-political actors (see Fast, 2014; chapter 6).
These explosive encounters have had implications for the possibility and productivity of interaction
because the anticipation of danger — a direct effect of these encounters — has led to an increase in the
securitization of foreign-aid spaces (Smirl, 2015). If interaction matters, as I assert it does, then this has
implications for the spaces that inhibit or enhance the possibility of it happening. Organizations providing
foreign assistance have increasingly routinized security features, adopting compounds, gated entries, guards,
1Examples of these explosive encounters include the 1996 murders at the Red Cross compound in Chechnya and the 2004
kidnapping and murder of Margaret Hassan, director of CARE International’s operation in Iraq (see Fast, 2014).
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and curfews that diminish the quantity and quality of interactions between workers and recipients (Fast,
2014; Smirl, 2015). The field’s adoption of protective measures and arms-length approaches could make
contact more precious precisely because these measures and approaches render it less likely to occur.
Yet while segregating promotes safety by cordoning off foreign-assistance workers from explosive encoun-
ters, it also prevents access to non-explosive ones. The structures that commonly constitute foreign-assistance
spaces — compounds, SUVs, informal enclavic spaces — limit contact, both the explosive encounters to which
attention has been paid and the nonstrategic but highly significant interactions I have explored. Regarding
security concerns, interaction can facilitate information-sharing between foreign-assistance workers and re-
cipients; the latter, for instance, can alert the former about rumors of attack (Fast et al., 2014; Gordon &
Young, 2017). It is therefore important for organizations relying on certain security structures and measures
to consider their non-obvious effects (e.g., how the structures that house foreign-assistance workers such as
fortified compounds and measures like curfews ultimately divide them from the communities they serve).
As a part of their security-management strategies, organizations should explore internal vulnerabilities as
opposed to focusing exclusively on external threats (Fast, 2014). The securitization of foreign-assistance
spaces has been regarded as “an unavoidable response to an exogenous decline in global security” (Duffield,
2012: 477). Yet, as Fast (2014: 211-212) has explored, the possibility exists that the securitization structures
and measures provoke rather than contain tensions, even though they exist to cordon off danger rather than
contribute to it.
Such a suggestion requires a critical reviewing of how foreign-assistance workers relate to the people
they are sent to serve via the space they occupy — that is, how much and in what forms. It may also
necessitate careful consideration, and possible revision, of the training materials, security measures, and
material structures that seek to protect foreign-assistance workers. Some of the trouble stems from the
tendency to place assumption over induction; by assuming the value of these measures rather than inducing
them from the context, “risk becomes ubiquitous and normal rather than contextual and specific” (Fast,
2014: 215). These a priori assumptions about risk may thwart creative approaches that appreciate the
context of a place requiring foreign assistance, “render[ing] the practice more bureaucratic and static as
opposed to flexible and responsive to the suffering of others” (Fast, 2014: 185). It is no easy task to honor,
on the one hand, the need for sustained interaction between foreign-assistance workers and recipients and,
on the other, the imperative to ensure workers’ security. The fate of meaningful, secure foreign assistance
may hinge on the ability of organizations to manage both.
Many compelling works document and explain dysfunctions that can accompany foreign assistance, dis-
cussing them despite the good intentions of the architects and implementers (e.g., Autesserre, 2014: 4-5; da
Costa & Karlsrud, 2012: 54; Dunn, 2017: 21; Kennedy, 2004; McMahon, 2017: 4, 12; Rahmena, 1997). My
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project reframes this, asking not what happens despite these good intentions but what can transpire because
of them. The possession of these good intentions by the average foreign-assistance worker matter for the
interactions to improve, not worsen, recipient assessments.
These good intentions can be powerful. Malkki (2015) studies the domestic facets of international hu-
manitarianism such as knitted handicrafts made to comfort children abroad — items generally relegated
to the periphery — and treats them as something to study about giving and neediness. These objects are
regarded as mere, “[b]ut we should not be too quick to suppose that we know what such practices do, or that
we know they do nothing” (Malkki, 2015: 202, emphasis in original). In a similar vein, this project invests in
interactions — and the actions taken within them — to explain attitudes toward foreign assistance. If this
paper’s contention is true, then it matters who is doing the work on the ground; it also matters how they
treat the people they are sent to assist.
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Appendix
TABLE 4: Survey Invitations and Response by Country in the World Bank’s 2012 Country Opinion Survey
(COS) Program, (29 countries)
Country Individuals Invited
to Participate
Participated (%)
Afghanistan 500 397 (79.4)
Albania 342 198 (57.9)
Angola 583 119 (20.4)
Argentina 279 104 (37.3)
Benin 687 600 (87.3)
Bulgaria 405 173 (42.7)
Burundi 581 325 (55.9)
Central African Republic 650 322 (49.5)
China 518 207 (40.0)
Congo, Republic of 402 361 (89.8)
Croatia 694 198 (28.5)
Djibouti 220 118 (53.6)
Ethiopia 620 326 (52.6)
Gambia 250 150 (60.0)
India 1,445 260 (18.0)
Indonesia 866 265 (30.6)
Kenya 600 373 (62.2)
Laos 1,017 523 (52.3)
Mauritania 215 110 (51.2)
Mauritius 303 153 (50.5)
Morocco 310 96 (31.0)
Nicaragua 328 240 (73.2)
Pakistan 1,000 512 (51.2)
Sao Tome and Principe 125 200 (62.5)
South Africa 481 69 (14.3)
Sri Lanka 550 296 (53.8)
Sudan 296 152 (51.4)
Tunisia 133 58 (43.6)
Zambia 553 312 (56.4)
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TABLE 5: Survey Invitations and Response by Country in the World Bank’s 2013 Country Opinion Survey
(COS) Program, (41 countries)
Country Individuals Invited
to Participate
Participated (%)
Armenia 213 192 (90.1)
Azerbaijan NA 173 (NA)
Bangladesh 701 366 (52.2)
Belarus 190 115 (60.5)
Bhutan 205 132 (64.4)
Botswana 300 241 (80.3)
Brazil 10,200 200 (2.0)
Burkina Faso 517 329 (63.6)
Cameroon 571 403 (70.6)
Colombia 665 271 (40.8)
Comoros 150 126 (84.0)
Democratic Republic of
the Congo
400 331 (82.8)
Dominican Republic 505 275 (54.4)
Georgia 276 162 (58.7)
Guatemala 90 62 (68.9)
Guinea 513 383 (74.7)
Honduras 300 130 (43.3)
Jamaica 160 108 (67.5)
Jordan 254 132 (52.0)
Kosovo 204 101 (49.5)
Kyrgyzstan 300 166 (55.3)
Lebanon 574 196 (34.1)
Malawi 600 427 (71.2)
Malaysia 287 74 (25.8)
Moldova 378 303 (80.2)
Montenegro 201 110 (54.7)
Namibia 314 90 (28.7)
Nepal 410 310 (75.6)
Niger 300 194 (64.7)
Nigeria 858 835 (97.3)
Panama 281 51 (18.1)
Paraguay 260 152 (58.5)
Philippines 1,536 328 (21.4)
Poland 278 92 (33.1)
Romania 191 81 (42.4)
Rwanda 826 714 (86.4)
Sierra Leone 600 340 (56.7)
South Sudan 300 191 (63.7)
Thailand 315 110 (34.9)
Uzbekistan 253 147 (58.1)
West Bank and Gaza 353 119 (33.7)
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TABLE 6: Survey Invitations and Response by Country in the World Bank’s 2014 Country Opinion Survey
(COS) Program, (35 countries)
Country Individuals Invited
to Participate
Participated (%)
Bolivia 440 210 (47.7)
Bosnia and Herzegovina 300 109 (36.3)
Costa Rica 310 127 (41.0)
Cote d’Ivoire 500 288 (57.6)
El Salvador 135 97 (71.9)
Gabon 250 222 (88.8)
Ghana 1,000 830 (83.0)
Guinea-Bissau 279 183 (65.6)
Haiti 409 204 (50.0)
Kazakhstan 372 192 (51.6)
Lesotho 142 106 (74.6)
Liberia 700 639 (91.3)
Macedonia 23,843 1,171 (4.9)
Madagascar 201 101 (50.2)
Maldives 300 104 (34.7)
Mali 751 260 (34.6)
Mexico 400 191 (47.8)
Mongolia 520 357 (68.7)
Mozambique 304 180 (59.2)
Myanmar 662 173 (26.1)
Papua New Guinea 463 150 (32.4)
Peru 465 197 (42.4)
Russia 393 139 (35.4)
Senegal 2,826 269 (9.5)
Serbia 642 253 (39.4)
Swaziland 300 142 (47.3)
Tajikistan 475 272 (57.3)
Tanzania 318 277 (87.1)
Timor-Leste 220 163 (74.1)
Turkey 742 279 (37.6)
Uganda 600 326 (54.3)
Uruguay 331 156 (47.1)
Vietnam 1,032 501 (48.5)
Yemen 600 296 (49.3)
Zimbabwe 246 183 (74.3)
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TABLE 7: Survey Invitations and Response by Country in the World Bank’s 2015 Country Opinion Survey
(COS) Program, (32 countries)
Country Individuals Invited
to Participate
Participated (%)
Afghanistan 500 407 (81.4)
Angola 386 91 (23.6)
Bahrain 139 40 (28.8)
Benin 545 442 (81.1)
Bulgaria 495 183 (37.0)
Burundi 312 209 (67.0)
Cabo Verde 272 107 (39.3)
Chad 401 277 (69.1)
Chile 486 49 (10.1)
China 570 184 (32.3)
Congo, Republic of 370 265 (71.6)
Croatia 871 175 (20.1)
Djibouti 304 191 (62.8)
Ethiopia 290 146 (50.3)
Gambia 657 274 (41.7)
India 580 263 (45.3)
Indonesia 1,089 316 (29.0)
Kenya 646 558 (86.4)
Kuwait 231 74 (32.0)
Laos 657 296 (45.1)
Mauritania 393 204 (51.9)
Mauritius 250 130 (52.0)
Oman 206 59 (28.6)
Pakistan 1,240 262 (21.1)
Sao Tome and Principe 361 290 (80.3)
Solomon Islands 86 55 (64.0)
South Africa 203 83 (40.9)
Sri Lanka 600 302 (50.3)
Sudan 439 273 (62.2)
Tunisia 763 202 (26.5)
United Arab Emirates 220 40 (18.2)
Zambia 546 304 (55.7)
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TABLE 8: Survey Invitations and Response by Country in the World Bank’s 2016 Country Opinion Survey
(COS) Program, (39 countries)
Country Individuals Invited
to Participate
Participated (%)
Argentina 208 90 (43.3)
Bangladesh 700 332 (47.4)
Bhutan 181 102 (56.4)
Bolivia 600 230 (38.3)
Botswana 300 256 (85.3)
Brazil 561 248 (44.2)
Burkina Faso 571 413 (72.3)
Cameroon 607 394 (64.9)
Colombia 745 186 (25.0)
Comoros 160 134 (84.0)
Costa Rica 475 171 (36.0)
Dominican Republic 624 201 (32.2)
Egypt 600 278 (46.3)
Georgia 308 166 (54.0)
Guatemala 367 279 (76.0)
Guinea 492 384 (78.0)
Honduras 360 180 (50.0)
Jamaica 244 91 (37.3)
Jordan 318 85 (26.7)
Kosovo 240 105 (43.8)
Kyrgyzstan 479 322 (67.2)
Lebanon 403 254 (63.0)
Macedonia 398 206 (51.8)
Malawi 500 340 (68.0)
Malaysia 871 258 (29.6)
Mexico 488 164 (33.6)
Moldova 528 255 (48.3)
Montenegro 216 126 (58.3)
Nepal 481 324 (67.4)
Niger 270 229 (84.8)
Nigeria 520 510 (98.1)
Panama 332 160 (48.2)
Paraguay 302 184 (60.9)
Peru 562 209 (37.2)
Philippines 2,230 352 (15.8)
Romania 454 105 (23.1)
Rwanda 400 254 (63.5)
Turkmenistan 85 57 (67.1)
Uzbekistan 303 156 (51.5)
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TABLE 9: Survey Invitations and Response by Country in the Afrobarometer 2002-2003 (16 countries)2
Country Individuals Invited
to Participate
Participated (%)
Botswana 1,559 1,200 (77.0)
Cabo Verde 1,518 1,268 (83.5)
Ghana 1,263 1,200 (95.0)
Kenya 4,018 2,398 (59.7)
Lesotho 1,313 1,200 (91.4)
Malawi 1,480 1,200 (81.1)
Mali 1,401 1,283 (91.6)
Mozambique 1,465 1,400 (95.6)
Namibia 1,920 1,199 (62.4)
Nigeria 3,960 2,428 (61.3)
Senegal NA 1,147 (NA)
South Africa 3,520 2,400 (68.2)
Tanzania 1,241 1,223 (98.5)
Uganda 3,058 2,400 (78.5)
Zambia 1,372 1,198 (87.3)
Zimbabwe 1,555 1,104 (71.0)
2For these numbers, see http://www.afrobarometer.org/surveys-and-methods/sampling-principles. The reported response
rate for Senegal was 94.4% based on 1,271 invited and 1,200 participated, but this does not match the number of Senegalese in
the data (n = 1,147).
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FIGURE 9: Collaboration with the World Bank Varies by Country in the 2012 Country Opinion Survey
(COS) Program (Minimum of 0.21, Maximum of 0.77)
Although 29 countries were included in the 2012 COS Program, five did not ask about respondent collaboration (China, Ethiopia, the
Gambia, Mauritania, and Sri Lanka).
50
FIGURE 10: Collaboration with the World Bank Varies by Country in the 2013 Country Opinion Survey
(COS) Program (Minimum of 0.11, Maximum of 0.81)
FIGURE 11: Collaboration with the World Bank Varies by Country in the 2014 Country Opinion Survey
(COS) Program (Minimum of 0.13, Maximum of 0.74)
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FIGURE 12: Collaboration with the World Bank Varies by Country in the 2015 Country Opinion Survey
(COS) Program (Minimum of 0.18, Maximum of 0.88)
Middle East refers to Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, which the COS Program grouped together, precluding
disaggregation by country for these four.
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FIGURE 13: Collaboration with the World Bank Varies by Country in the 2016 Country Opinion Survey
(COS) Program (Minimum of 0.12, Maximum of 0.64)
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